The following review appears in the new issue of International Affairs
Command and control. By Eric Schlosser. London: Allen Lane.
2013. 656pp. Index.
£25.00. isbn 978 1 84614 148 5. Available as e-book.
As our most dangerous creation, nuclear weapons should never
be out of our minds. But since the end of the Cold War some—at least in the
West—have viewed them as somewhat passé.
Yet thousands of these machines remain ready to inflict incredible destruction.
The possibility of nuclear war or accidents remains appallingly high, and the
link between the two is clearer than ever. With the Cold War passing into
history, we can now better appreciate how close humanity came to oblivion
because of accidents, misunderstandings and failings in command and control
systems. Eric Schlosser has taken this history and brilliantly synthesized it
with science, theory, politics, interviews with and insights into the people
involved. He shows not only how often we came close to nuclear holocaust, but how
this nightmare continues.
Schlosser packs a lot into the book. Foremost is an accident
in 1980 at a missile silo near Damascus, Arkansas. Told in a way that rivals
any airport thriller, the story brings out the consequences that spiral from a
dropped socket puncturing the fuel tank of a Titan II missile with a 9-megaton
warhead atop it. Events in Damascus structure the book, with chapters on the
Cold War and the situation in the silo developing side by side. As the world
approached the climax of the 1980s nuclear arms race, the Damascus missile
exploded, killing one man and throwing the warhead several hundred feet from
the silo.
Along the way you lose count of the incidents and accidents
detailed. The book notes that one US study found that between 1950 and 1968 at
least 1,200 nuclear weapons were involved in significant accidents. What shocks
is not so much incidents of lost nuclear weapons; or security breaches; or the
failure of numerous safety features apart from the most basic switches; or
failures of early warning systems; or how nuclear weapons were accidently
launched, dropped, smashed, crushed in lifts; or numerous plane crashes where nuclear
weapons were subjected to intense fires; or failures in safety systems designed
to cope with accidents. What is most shocking is how many of these were hidden
from those responsible for the safety of the system. And concerns remain today,
for example with regard to the safety of the location of warheads on Trident missiles,
including those used by Britain.
Concentrating on individual incidents overlooks the
purpose—and title—of the book: the struggle to build and manage a command and
control system to manage securely nuclear weapons in war and peace. Those with
knowledge of nuclear weapons will find here familiar debates about theories of
nuclear war; of struggles to manage the breath-taking insanity of SIOP (the
Single Integrated Operational Plan); the always/never dilemma; of how decisions
over nuclear weapons have too often been less about safety and reliability than
about reputations. References, notes on sources and bibliography stretch over
an impressive 122 pages.
The civil−military and interpersonal tensions bring out Schlosser’s journalist skills. He gives some excellent pen-portraits of the men involved. He gives special attention to the men on the ground, the impact on them and their families, and the paltry recognition they receive. This is not just a journalist’s desire for ‘human interest’; understanding these men is essential when coming to terms with why mistakes happen and how the system responds to their individual behaviour. Schlosser has a love−hate relationship with high-ranking men such as Curtis LeMay or Robert McNamara. While he respects their determination to bring strict order and control to nuclear weapon systems, he is never blind to the darker side of what they set out to build and control.
Schlosser’s aim is not policy recommendations, or comparing
the United States with other countries. By the time the book turns to other
states you are left in little doubt that if the US record is a guide, then an
even more terrifying book is yet to be written about what has—and is—happening
elsewhere. Schlosser’s aim is more about challenging the unacceptable and
frightening negligence that has surrounded the issue in the United States.
Inspired by the work of Charles Perrow’s Normal accidents (Basic, 1984)—arguing
that accidents are normal in complex systems—Schlosser writes that the way
forward is to keep the danger clearly in mind and under scrutiny. Tucked away
on page 499, in the final sentences of the ‘notes on sources’, Schlosser sets
out his hope: ‘The suppression of the truth has allowed a small and elite group
of policy makers to wield tremendous, largely unchecked power. There are few
issues more important than what nuclear weapons can do, where they are aimed,
why they might be used, and who has the ability to order their use. I hope my
book contributes, in some small way, to restoring a semblance of democracy to the
command and control of the deadliest, most dangerous machines that mankind has
ever invented.’ Amen to that.
Tim Oliver, Johns Hopkins University, USA
EXTRA, added 1 September 2014. If you want a brilliant take on this issue, one which draws on Schlosser's work, then check out this piece by John Oliver from Last Week Tonight: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Y1ya-yF35g&feature=youtu.be
EXTRA, added 1 September 2014. If you want a brilliant take on this issue, one which draws on Schlosser's work, then check out this piece by John Oliver from Last Week Tonight: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Y1ya-yF35g&feature=youtu.be
